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Real-Time Economic Analysis and
Policy Development During the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Joseph E. Aldy

64 Vand. L. Rev. 1795 (2011)

The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill posed near-term
economic risks to the Gulf of Mexico region and raised
questions about appropriatepolicies to mitigate catastrophic
oil-spill risks. This Essay reviews the Obama Administration's
assessment of the economic vulnerabilities to the spill, the
Administration'sMay 12, 2010, legislative proposal focused on
minimizing the adverse economic impacts to workers and
small businesses in the Gulf of Mexico, and the effort to secure
an agreement with BP to ensure that those harmed by the spill
will receive full compensation. Then, the Essay discusses
several of the policy reforms advanced by the Administration to
reduce the risks of future catastrophic oil spills, including the
value of an industry consortium to provide deepwater wellcontainment resources and the need to remove the arbitrary
limit on liability for economic damages from offshore drilling.
The Essay closes with a few policy lessons learned from the
spill.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Late in the evening of April 20, 2010, the Transocean
Deepwater Horizon, a mobile drilling rig operating for BP in the Gulf
of Mexico's Macondo Prospect, lost control of an exploratory well and
suffered a catastrophic blowout. The U.S. Coast Guard immediately
dispatched vessels for search and rescue and fire fighting. By early the
next morning, as the fire raged on the drilling rig and eleven rig
workers remained missing, a senior executive at BP reached out to the
*
Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; Nonresident Fellow,
Resources for the Future; Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research. The
author served as the Special Assistant to the President for Energy and Environment, reporting
through the White House National Economic Council and Office of Energy and Climate Change
in 2009 and 2010. During the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Aldy coordinated the Obama
Administration's economic analysis of the oil spill and the legislative policy response to improve
offshore-drilling safety (including revising the liability regime), undertook analysis to inform and
participate in the negotiations over the independent claims facility and escrow account, and
engaged oil industry stakeholders on the need for improved deepwater well-containment capacity
and processes.
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White House to inform senior staff of this major accident. On April 22,
the drilling rig collapsed and sank nearly a mile to the sea floor
resulting in an oil spill that lasted for nearly three months. Soon after
an event celebrating Earth Day with environmental leaders on the
White House South Lawn, President Obama met with senior
administration officials in the Oval Office to discuss the oil spill and
the government's response. The President tasked his team to mobilize
all necessary government assets to search for the lost rig workers, to
contain the spill, and to mitigate the economic and environmental
harm from the spill. To complement the operational response, the
Administration began to develop measures to mitigate the economic
risks posed by the oil spill and to assess policy measures that could
reduce the risks of future oil spills.
Over the course of the spring and summer of 2010, the
government managed an unprecedented response to the largest oil
spill in U.S. history. The U.S. Coast Guard coordinated the multiagency response and directed BP, the responsible party, in mobilizing
more than 800 specialized skimmers, 120 aircraft, 8,000 vessels,
nearly 50,000 responders, and two drilling rigs to drill relief wells.'
The response included the deployment of nearly four million feet of
boom, numerous controlled burns, effective use of dispersants, and the
recovery of nearly one million barrels of oil. An ad hoc team of
scientists and experts from U.S. government agencies, Department of
Energy national laboratories, BP, and the oil and gas industry
designed, evaluated, and executed various well-control options. Some
of these included a cofferdam, a dome placed above a large leak
intended to collect the escaping hydrocarbons; a top kill, where heavy
drilling mud is pumped into the top of the well through the choke and
kill lines of the blowout preventer; a junk shot, where various material
(including golf balls and rubber pieces) are pumped into the bottom of
the blowout preventer; and a top hat, a collection device installed atop
the severed riser above the blowout preventer. 2 Finally, a capping
stack-a procedure requiring the removal of the top hat and the
remainder of the riser (and temporarily increasing the flow of oil),
effectively a modified blowout preventer-stopped the release of oil
from the well on July 15, 2010, and a relief well permanently killed

1.

Press Release, The White House, Ongoing Responses and Recovery to the Deepwater

Horizon Oil Spill (June 2011) (on file with the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW).
2.
For more details, refer to the discussion of well containment in chapter 5 of the NAT'L
COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE
GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 129-71 (2011).
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the Macondo Prospect well on September 19, 2010. 3 As the first largescale test of offshore spill containment by both the U.S. oil and gas
industry and the government agencies responsible for spill response
under the policy regime established by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
("OPA"), 4 some elements of the response were more effective than
others.5 There should be no doubt, however, that the aggressive
deployment of spill-control assets, such as boom and skimmers, and
development of innovative techniques, such as subsea-dispersant
application and the eventually successful capping of the well,
significantly mitigated the adverse economic and environmental
impacts of the spill.
As the operational response proceeded, the Administration
undertook a rapid evaluation of the potential economic impacts of the
spill and initiated a policy review. In this Essay, I review the
Administration's assessment of the economic vulnerabilities to the
spill; the Administration's legislative proposal of May 12, 2010, which
focused on minimizing the adverse economic impacts to workers and
small businesses in the Gulf of Mexico; and the effort to secure an
agreement with BP to ensure that those harmed by the spill will
receive full compensation. Then, I turn to discuss several of the policy
reforms advanced by the Administration to reduce the risks of future
catastrophic oil spills. The Essay closes with a few policy lessons
learned from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

II. ASSESSING THE OIL SPILL'S ECONOMIC IMPACTS
In its initial assessment of the spill's impacts, the
Administration's economic team focused on vulnerable industries,
such as fishing and tourism, and vulnerable infrastructure, such as
shipping channels and ports, oil pipelines and port facilities, and
industrial facilities along the coast. 6 Through this effort, the team
compiled and reviewed high-frequency data, such as weekly
3.
4.

Id. at 161-70.
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006).

5.

Refer to the recommendations made by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater

Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL
SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supranote 2, at 249-91.
The economic team referenced in this Essay was coordinated by the National Economic
6.

Council and included significant participation by the Council of Economic Advisers, as well as
contributions of data and analysis by the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Interior, Department of Labor, Department of
Transportation, Department of the Treasury, the Domestic Policy Council, and the Office of
Management and Budget.
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unemployment insurance claims; private-sector data, such as retail
lodging vacancy rates; and historic employment and revenue data for
vulnerable industries in the Gulf Coast region.
In evaluating the potential economic impacts of the spill, the
economic team did not address the question of potential damages
borne by the U.S. government. For example, a Natural Resource
Damage Assessment, which is necessary to assess the economic harm
experienced by federal and state resource trustees, was beyond the
scope of this effort. The resource trustees did initiate efforts to collect
and analyze data on baseline conditions during the period after the
spill began and before oil impacted the shoreline. The trustees will
continue their work in evaluating the environmental damage and will
eventually take their case for natural resource damages to the
7
responsible parties.
The fishery industry quickly experienced adverse impacts from
the spill. By the first week in May 2010, just as the spring shrimping
season began, the State of Louisiana closed some state waters and the
federal government closed some federal waters to fishing.8 This
presented several economic problems that the team analyzed. First,
the economic team pulled together data to understand the scope of
economic activity associated with Gulf fishing. This included
consideration of both commercial and recreational activities that could
be affected by the spill and involved addressing several questions such
as the following: How did the timing, duration, and geographic
coverage of fishery closures affect typical seasonal and locational
fishery activities? What impact could this have on related businesses,
such as seafood processing facilities and restaurants that use
commercially harvested fish and lodging and other tourism activities
associated with recreational fishing? Next, the Administration
recognized that consumers might react negatively to Gulf fish due to
concerns about oil contamination, even if the fish were harvested in
open federal or state fisheries located far from the spill. This
7.
See Press Release, Dep't of the Interior & Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.,
Resource Restoration Planning Process Begins for BPlDeepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Sept. 29,
2010),
available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/09/29/resource-restorationplanning-process-begins-bpdeepwater-horizon-oil-spill; Press Release, Office of Response and
Restoration, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: NOAA NRDA Activities as of May 7, 2010 (May 7,
2010), available at http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/bookshelf/1959_deepwater-HorizonNRDA-ORR-web-5-7-10.pdf.
8.
Press Release, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NOAA Closes Commercial and
Recreational Fishing in Oil-Affected Portion of Gulf of Mexico (May 4, 2010), available at
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/05/04/noaa-closes-commercial-and-recreationalfishing-oil-affected-portion-gulf-mexico.
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motivated the Administration's efforts to enhance Gulf of Mexico
seafood testing to assure the public that the fish were safe to eat.9
In the end, businesses that relied on coastal tourism
experienced significant losses from the fear of oil-covered beaches
throughout the Gulf.1 0 As one way to assess the effect of the spill, the
economic team obtained vacancy data for many hotels on the Gulf
Coast. While some hotels in Louisiana experienced a decline in
vacancies from the year before (reflecting both a weak 2009 tourism
season and the concentration of spill-response activity in Louisiana),
beach destinations further east, in Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida,
appeared to take an economic hit despite never witnessing oil.1
Given significant uncertainties about the duration, magnitude,
and location of spill impacts, understanding potentially vulnerable
infrastructure served a key role in informing both the operational
response to and the economic assessment of the spill. The Macondo
Prospect spilled oil about fifty miles south of the Mississippi River, a
major shipping channel. The Coast Guard established procedures for
inspecting and, if necessary, cleaning the hulls of vessels to prevent oil
from being carried upstream into freshwater and ports. 12 This
informed the economic team's assessment of potential adverse impacts
of shipping delays that could occur if sufficient amounts of oil moved
toward the Mississippi River and the Intracoastal Waterway. The
Coast Guard established several monitoring and cleaning stations to

9.
To further signal confidence in the safety of the Gulf Coast harvest, the White House
Mess made a point of serving Gulf-sourced seafood-fish and shrimp-during the summer of
2010. In August 2010, the Louisiana Seafood Board served a thirty-foot shrimp-and-oyster po'
boy sandwich to White House staff. Colleen Rush, 30-Foot Po-Boy Served at White House,
NEWORLEANS.COM (Aug. 12, 2010, 5:11 PM), http://dining.neworleans.com/2OlO/08/30-foot-poboy-served-at-white -house/.
10. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., NOAA, FDA Continue Ramping Up Efforts to
Seafood
(June
14,
2010),
available at
Ensure
Safety
of Gulf of Mexico
[hereinafter
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm215493.htm
FDA Press Release]; Press Release, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Gulf Seafood Safety &
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Aug. 27, 2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.
gov/release/2010/08127/gulf-seafood-safety-bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill.
11.

See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,

supra note 2, at 191; David Segal, Should the Money Go Where the Oil Didn't?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 2010, at BUL.
12. The U.S. Coast Guard's Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit focuses on
restoring the commercial capacity of waterways after a natural or man-made disruption of
activity pursuant to the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, 46 U.S.C.A. § 70103
(West 2011), and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116
Stat. 2064 (2002).
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minimize the risk of oil carried upriver and to limit the length of
shipping delays if cleaning became necessary. 13
The Department of Homeland Security shared its evaluation of
potentially vulnerable infrastructure, beyond the ports and shipping
lanes covered by the U.S. Coast Guard. For example, a number of
power plants and manufacturing facilities situated on the shoreline
use Gulf of Mexico water in the production process and could have had
to shut down if impacted by a sufficient quantity of oil.14 This
information also assisted the operational response, including the
deployment of assets, such as boom and skimmers, to minimize these
economic risks.
The economic team closely followed potential impacts of the
spill on the oil market. First, the spill posed risks to oil-related
infrastructure. During the first week of the spill, the Nakika crude-oil
pipeline, which runs on the sea floor near the Macondo Prospect and
transports about 75,000 barrels per day, was shut down as a
precautionary measure due to concern that debris from the oil rig
could damage it. 15 In addition, some tanker operators expressed
concern about traversing oil-sheen waters to access the Louisiana
Offshore Oil Port ("LOOP"), the only major U.S. offshore oil facility
that typically handles more than one million barrels per day of oil
imports.16 Regular monitoring of the LOOP, northwest of the Macondo
Prospect, informed both the economic team and those in the Coast

13. In May 2010, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") began to
survey sites for anchoring vessels for inspection and, if necessary, oil decontamination. Press
Release, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NOAA Surveys Proposed New Ship Anchorage
Site for Vessel Decontamination (May 28, 2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.
gov/release/20 10/05/28/noaa-surveys-proposed-new-ship-anchorage-site-vessel-decontamination.
By June 2010, the Coast Guard had established seventeen stations for decontamination of
vessels. See Press Release, Unified Command, Vessel Decontamination Stations Available
Around Louisiana (June 20, 2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/
2010/06/20/vessel-decontamination-stations-available-around-louisiana.
14. See generally DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY AND ENERGY RELIABILITY,
DEEPWATER HORIZON SITUATION REPORT #4 (2010), available at http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/

docs/2010_SitRep_.4_Deep_.Horizon 051210_200PM.pdf; Marianne Lavelle, Oil Spill Poses Risks
to Gulf Power Plants, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, May 27, 2010, http://news.nationalgeographic.

com/news/2010/05/102705-energy-oil-spill-risks-gulf-power-plants/.
15. Joshua Schenyer, Shell Oil Pipeline, Platform Restart in U.S. Gulf, REUTERS, Apr. 27,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/27/oil-shell-pipeline-idUSN272528
9620100427.
16.

See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LOUISIANA ENERGY FACT SHEET (2010),

available
at
http://www.eia.gov/state/state-energy-profiles-print.cfm?sid=LA
information on energy consumption and industry).

(providing
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Guard responsible for responding to risks that oil sheen posed to oil
tankers.1 7
Second, the team tracked crude-oil futures markets on a daily
basis, including the front-month contract price, which is a high-quality
predictor of spot prices, and more distant futures and options
contracts to assess expectations about oil prices. The regular analysis
of these markets presented policymakers with an understanding of
expected (average) prices over the next few months, as well as the
probability that the price of oil would exceed a specified level (e.g.,
$100 per barrel) over the coming months.' 8 The price of oil did not
change much in response to the oil spill or to spill-related news over
the course of the summer. Crude-oil prices averaged about $76 per
barrel during the nearly three months that oil spilled from the
Macondo Prospect, about $4 per barrel less than the average price of
oil from January 1, 2010, through April 20, 2010.19 A variety of other
economic factors-such as the risk of Greek debt default and weak
U.S. employment data-appeared to drive crude-oil prices in the
20
spring and summer of 2010.
III. MITIGATING THE OIL SPILL'S ECONOMIC IMPACTS
As the economic team developed its assessment of real-time
and near-term potential economic impacts of the spill, the
Administration proposed a legislative package to enhance the federal
government's capacity to respond to the spill, including its ability to
mitigate the economic harm to fishermen, small businesses, and those
left unemployed by the spill.21 On May 12, 2010, the Administration
17. Bruce Nichols, LOOP Offshore Oil Port Staying Open Despite Spill, REUTERS, June 3,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2010/06103/oil-spill-loop-idUSN03526540201
00603.
18.

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK: ENERGY PRICE VOLATILITY

AND FORECAST UNCERTAINTY (May 2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/emeu/steo/pub
/uncertainty/may lOuncertainty.pdf.
19. Declining oil prices moving from spring into summer 2010 countered the typical
seasonal trend in the United States. Over 2000-2009, crude-oil prices during the May-August
months averaged about seventeen percent more than crude-oil prices during the January-April
months. Histories of daily crude-oil futures prices are available at NYMEX Futures Prices, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet-pri-fut sld.htm (last visited Sept. 27,

2011).
20. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM MARKETING MONTHLY: SEPT. 2010, at viii,
available at http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil -gas/petroleum/data-publications/petroleum-marketingmonthly/historical/2010/2010_09/pdf/hilites.pdf (discussing economic factors that affected oil
prices).
21. See Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House of Representatives (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
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submitted to Congress its legislative proposal. 22 The assistance
component of the policy response focused on a variety of measures,
some of which were similar to what is available after a Stafford Act
declaration for a natural disaster.
When there is a natural disaster, such as a tornado or a
hurricane, there isn't a "responsible party" as there is with an oil spill.
After a natural disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
provides resources to assist those who have lost their jobs, property,
and so forth under the Stafford Act. 23 The Administration's
unemployment assistance proposal for the oil spill, modeled after
unemployment assistance under the Stafford Act, was designed to
benefit immediately those who were potentially ineligible for standard
unemployment insurance (e.g., the self-employed). 2 4 It also included a
provision that would allow the U.S. government to recoup
25
unemployment assistance expenditures from the responsible party.
In doing so, the proposal to assist the unemployed mirrored the
provisions under the Stafford Act while maintaining financial liability
for the responsible party. 26 In a similar fashion, the Administration
proposed to expand the coverage of the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program ("SNAP") by replicating the use of this assistance
tool under a Stafford Act natural disaster declaration. Like the
unemployment assistance provision, the oil-spill SNAP provision
permitted the U.S. government to seek full payment by the
responsible party for all SNAP expenditures associated with the oil
spill.27
The economic environment on the Gulf Coast and ambiguity
about compensation by the responsible parties made near-term
assistance essential. For example, anecdotal evidence showed that
many fishermen were cash-strapped after making investments to
sites/default/files/omb/assets/budgetLamendments/supplemental
President's legislative proposal).

O5 12-10.pdf

(outlining

the

22. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FY 2010 SUPPLEMENTAL
PROPOSAL IN THE FY 2011 BUDGET (2010) [hereinafter FY 2010 SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSAL],

available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/budgetamendments/
supplemental_05_12_1O.pdf; Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill Legislative Package (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/fact-sheet-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-legislative-package.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2006).
24. See Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 21, § 3.
25. Id.
26. In the legislative proposal, see id. at sections 3(a) and 3(j). In the Stafford Act, see 42
U.S.C. § 5177.

27. See Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 21, § 6(c) (discussing SNAP). Congress did
not pass legislation establishing these new authorizations and appropriating funds.
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recover from the 2005 and 2008 hurricane seasons that damaged
many fishing vessels and related assets. 28 Without some form of
support, a lost fishing season could have devastating effects on some of
these fishermen and their families. To ameliorate these problems, the
Administration proposed $15 million in fishery disaster aid,
conditioned upon the declaration of a disaster and triggered when
compensation by the responsible parties is insufficient. On May 24,
2010, the Secretary of Commerce declared a fishery disaster under the
Magnusson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 29 and
Congress appropriated $15 million for fishery disaster aid on July 29,
2010.30
To address concerns about seafood contamination, potentially
resulting in reduced demand for Gulf Coast harvested fish, the
Administration implemented an extensive seafood-testing protocol in
the Gulf and proposed additional funding for the Food and Drug
Administration to monitor and respond to the adverse environmental
health impacts from the spill.3 1 Congress provided $2 million in
supplemental appropriations for the salaries and expenses incurred
32
from this enhanced testing activity.
These elements of the Administration's proposal complemented
various forms of assistance available through existing programs. For
example, the Small Business Administration made economic injury
disaster loans available to small businesses in Louisiana within weeks
of the start of the spill. 33 The Coast Guard also attempted to orient
spill-response activities to those impacted by the spill. The Coast
Guard worked with BP to implement the Vessels of Opportunity
Program, which contracted local commercial and charter fishing

28.

Refer to the discussion of impacts on fishing communities in NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP

DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 2, at 193. For a discussion of

the response to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Ike, see LDWF's Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Response, LOUSIANA CONSERVATIONIST, http://louisianaconservationist.org/ldwfs-deepwaterhorizon-oil-spill-response/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1861a (2006); Press Release, Dep't of Commerce, Sec'y Locke Announces
Fishery Failure Determination in Gulf of Mexico (May 24, 2010), available at
http://www.commerce.gov/blog/2og/205/24/secretary-locke-announces-fishery-failuredetermination-gulf-mexico.
30. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, § 2004, 124 Stat. 2302,
2338 (2010).

31. See FDA Press Release, supra note 10.
32. Supplemental Appropriations Act tit. II, 124 Stat. at 2336.
33. Press Release, Small Bus. Admin., SBA Makes Economic Injury Assistance in More La.
Parishes (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/05/12/sbamakes-economic-injury-assistance-more-la-parishes.
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vessels for use in spill response and thus created employment
34
opportunities for many fishermen impacted by the fisheries' closure.
This focus on providing supplemental resources to assist those
most impacted by the oil spill reflected a weakness in the status quo
legal framework. When family and financial needs are dire, the timing
of the compensation process under the Oil Pollution Act, or OPA, may
be too slow. For example, under the OPA, a harmed party can submit
a claim to a responsible party, but it may take up to ninety days to
process and can still result in rejection of the claim. 35 The harmed
party could then go to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund ("OSLTF')
and potentially wait another ninety days before receiving
compensation. 36 If the harmed party is not satisfied by the
compensation offered by either the responsible party or the OSLTF,
then the party can go to the courts with an unknown time until
resolution. 37 This is further complicated by the ambiguity about
whether the responsible parties in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
would pay more than $75 million in economic damages, which is the
limit on liability under the OPA. 38 The imposition-of a limit on liability
would mean that taxpayers or those harmed by the spill would have to
39
bear any damages exceeding $75 million.

34. BP, FACTSHEET ON BP VESSELS OF OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM 1 (2010), available at
http://www.bp.com/liveassetstbp-internet/globalbp/globalbp-ukenglishlincident-response/STAG
ING/local-assets/downloads-pdfs/factsheet-bp-vesses-of-opportunity-program.pdf.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c)(2) (2006).
36. NAT'L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., U.S. COAST GUARD, CLAIMANT'S GUIDE: A COMPLIANCE
GUIDE FOR SUBMITTING CLAIMS UNDER THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990, at 6 (rev. Nov. 2009),
availableat http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/docs/PDFs/urg/Ch6/NPFCClaimantGuide.pdf.
37. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006). Note that the $75 million limit on liability for economic
damages does not apply in the case of gross negligence or a violation of an applicable federal
safety, construction, or operating regulation.
39. In the case of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, if the responsible parties did not pay
for damages in excess of $75 million, then harmed parties could make claims to the OSLTF.
NAT'L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., supra note 36, at 4. The payouts from the OSLTF for economic
damages and government-incurred cleanup costs (including those subsequently reimbursed by
the responsible parties) cannot exceed $1 billion per spill under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (2006). With U.S. government cleanup costs of about $700 million
through May 2011, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC, U.S. COAST GUARD, BILL N10036-009-11 (May
10, 2011), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdflbp-billll.pdf, this would have resulted in available funds for damage compensation of about $300
million. The parties with the balance of damages would have gone uncompensated unless the
government appropriated additional monies to keep them whole.
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A. Establishingan Independent Claims Facilityand
Escrow Account
By early May 2010, Lamar McKay, the President of BP
America, stated in a congressional hearing that BP "is committed to
paying legitimate claims for other loss and damages caused by the
spill," which signaled that BP would go beyond the $75 million
liability limit under the OPA.40 These statements did not eliminate
uncertainty about both BP's liability and the operation of the claims
and compensation process. Would BP actually go beyond $75 million?
If BP did so, then how would that voluntary action affect an
assessment of gross negligence or violation of an applicable
government regulation, the two bases for removing the liability limit
under the OPA? 41 For claims paid beyond $75 million, would BP go to
42
the OSLTF and try to recover those expenditures?
The residents of the Gulf Coast, politicians in Washington,
D.C., and BP's investors remained concerned about the uncertainty
regarding the compensation to those harmed by the oil spill. By June
2010, anecdotes of frustration with BP's claims process from Gulf
residents became more common. 43 BP's market capitalization had
fallen by one half, from about $190 billion on April 20, 2010, to about
$95 billion by mid-June 2010. 44 BP's bonds and credit default swaps
traded as if the company had lost its investment-grade rating, and, in
some cases, there were emerging problems with finding counterparties
for the credit default swaps (i.e., sellers of such derivatives on BP
45
corporate bonds experienced difficulty in finding willing buyers).
Members of Congress expressed skepticism about BP's willingness and
ability to compensate for the harm caused by the spill, with some

40. Written Testimony: HearingBefore the S. Energy & Natural Res. Comm., 111th Cong. 8
(2010) (statement of Lamar McKay, Chairman & President, BP America), available at
http:/energy.senate.gov/publicL/files[McKayTestimony051 110.pdf.
41. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 2708 (2006) permits the responsible party to assert a claim if the limit on
liability applies and its removal (cleanup) costs and damages exceed the amount of the limit
established in 33 U.S.C. § 2704.
43. John Leland, Local Officials Simmer Over BP Recovery Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2010, at A20.
44. Gregory White, And Now BP's Market Cap Has Been Halved, Bus. INSIDER (June 9,
2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/bp-market-cap-2010-6.
45. John Detrixhe & Shannon D. Harrington, BP Trades as Junk, Credit-Default Swaps
Invert: Credit Markets, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 10, 2010), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2010-06-10bp-junked-by-bond-investors-as-credit-default-swaps-invert-creditmarkets.html.
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speculation among politicians and Wall Street analysts that BP would
46
declare bankruptcy.
To resolve this legal and economic uncertainty, on June 16,
2010, the President convened a meeting with BP's Chairman of the
Board, BP's senior management, Vice President Biden, and senior
administration officials to negotiate the claims and escrow process.
After an initial discussion, a smaller group consisting of a few White
House senior staff, one of the top lawyers from the Department of
Justice, and the Coast Guard Commandant worked with BP to
negotiate the parameters of the agreement. The one-page fact sheet
issued by the White House represented the framework of the
agreement that was elaborated on by Department of Justice staff
47
attorneys and BP.
The June 16, 2010, agreement transferred the processing of
claims from BP to a new, independent entity headed by Kenneth
Feinberg, who had previously led the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund.48 Responsibilities of this new facility included
developing and publishing its own standards for claims and
establishing a three-judge panel to review appeals of the facility's
decisions. Individuals and businesses had the option to submit claims
to the independent facility, but they retained their rights to take the
responsible party to court or to submit a claim to the OSLTF if
unsatisfied with the independent claims facility's decision. 49 BP
continued to handle claims by local, state, tribal, and federal
governments.
The agreement also established a $20 billion escrow account
that represented neither a floor nor a ceiling on BP's liability for
damages. 50 The escrow paid both claims processed through the
independent claims facility and claims for economic liability
determined through negotiations between BP and natural resource
trustees, which remained beyond the scope of coverage of the claims
46. Sumeet Desai, British PM Fears BP's 'Destruction,'Stock Plunges, REUTERS, June 25,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/25/us-oil-spill-idUSN14163
2010,
92020100625; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Imagining the Worst in BP's Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2010, at B1. While bankruptcy risk did not appear likely given the productivity of BP's assets
outside of the Macondo Prospect, some had speculated more credibly about takeover risk. This
could have impacted spill-response operations and corporate policy on compensation and claims
in unknown ways.
47. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Claims and Escrow (June 16, 2010),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-claims-and-escrow.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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facility. 51 In addition, BP had the ability to draw from the escrow to
pay for local- and state-requested spill-response costs. 52 BP agreed to
fund the $20 billion escrow account at a rate of $5 billion per year over
four years and provide U.S. assets as collateral. 53 Given the
tremendous uncertainties at that time about the duration and
magnitude of the spill, and hence the ultimate economic damages, the
$20 billion figure was consistent with the economic team's review of
more than a half dozen financial institutions' damage estimates,
54
which by June 2010 were in the $10 billion to $20 billion range.
This agreement had a very important impact for the people of
the Gulf Coast, for BP, and for the Administration. With this deal, BP
provided assurance for its investors. This deal helped to reassure
many people residing along the Gulf Coast. BP had a concrete, public
plan to show that it had the intent and the means to compensate those
harmed by the spill. The creation of the independent claims facility
addressed many of the criticisms of BP's initial claims effort. In effect,
it reflected a recognition that damage claims are not a part of the core
competency of BP, so BP should exit the business of reviewing and
processing claims. While the Feinberg claims facility has experienced
a few criticisms as well, it has worked fairly well and certainly better
than its predecessor. 55 The best evidence of this may be the fact that
some believe that the fund has been too stringent, slow, and unfair in

51. Id.
52. This final category of local and state response costs reflected BP's concerns that state
requests, such as Louisiana's request to construct berms, could become very expensive (if not
very effective).
53. Id.
54. Most of the published estimates are available only in for-pay analyst reports. According
to Andrew Ross Sorkin, supra note 46, Credit Suisse estimated BP's economic damage claims for
gulf fishermen and the tourism industry at $14 billion.
55. In addition to the creation of the $20 billion escrow account and the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility operated by Feinberg, BP also agreed on June 16 to create a $100 million Rig Worker
Assistance Fund to benefit those workers temporarily unemployed as a result of the deepwater
drilling suspension that occurred from May through October 2010. Claims made by rig workers
only totaled about $5 million in 2010. This fund expanded its coverage in 2011 to provide
assistance to workers who provided support to offshore drilling rigs, and interest in this second
round continued to be very modest. See David Hammer, Offshore Workers Shun Aid from BP,
TIME-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 9, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nola.com
news/index.ssf2011/05/bpsrig-workerassistancefund.html.
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distributing monies,5 6 while BP has argued that the fund has been too
57
generous.
IV. REDUCING THE RISK OF FUTURE OIL SPILLS

Over the past few decades, technological innovations have
significantly advanced the exploration and production of hydrocarbons
in deep water. In 1980, the maximum water depth drilled in the Gulf
of Mexico was about two thousand feet. 58 In 1990, the maximum water
depth exceeded six thousand feet, and over the past ten years, the
maximum water depth of offshore wells has ranged near ten thousand
feet. 59 Technological progress on the resource extraction dimension,
especially into fundamentally new frontiers, such as depths measured
in miles in pitch-black deepwater environments with pressures
several orders of magnitude greater than the pressure at sea level,
suggests the value in pursuing technological innovation in the safety
dimension as well.
Promoting safety in offshore drilling to reduce the risk of future
oil spills will require active involvement by the oil industry. Of course,
the government expects the private sector to implement the
promulgated safety regulations. 60 More importantly, the private sector

56. Moira Herbst, For $20 Billion BP Claims Fund, Legal Challenges Loom, REUTERS, Apr.
21, 2011, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/201 1/04/20/uk-oil-spill-fund-idUKTRE
73J76A20110420.
57. Catherine Clifford, BP: Gulf Oil Spill Payments Are Too Generous, CNNMONEY (Feb.
17, 2011), http:lmoney.cnn.com/2Ol1/02/17/smallbusiness/bp-paymentsgenerous/index.htm.
58. Nat'l Comm'n on the DeepwaterHorizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, A Brief History
of Offshore Oil Drilling 10-12 & fig.3 (Staff Working Paper No. 1, 2010), available at http://
www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/defaultfiles/documents/A%2Brief%2OHistory%20off%/2OOffsho
re%20DrillingO/o20Working/2OPaper%208%2023%2010.pdf.
59. Id.
60. The Department of the Interior issued two safety-related Notices to Lessees in June
2010 (NTL No. 2010-N05, NTL No. 2010-N06) to enhance the safety of offshore drilling. U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS
OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS): INCREASED SAFETY

MEASURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE OCS (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/
deepwaterhorizonuploadFINAL-Safety-Measures-NTL.pdf;
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
MINERALS MGMT. SERV., NATIONAL NOTICE To LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND
GAS LEASES, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS): INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLORATION
PLANS, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PLANS, AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS COORDINATION
DOCUMENTS ON THE OCS (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon
/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=35724. In addition, the Department promulgated
a Drilling Safety Rule and a Workplace Safety Rule in September 2010. Press Release, Dep't of
the Interior, Salazar Announces Regulations to Strengthen Drilling Safety, Reduce Risk of
Human Error on Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://
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has the resources and the technological expertise to develop new
safety processes, procedures, and equipment. It's important to
recognize the value in tapping the expertise within the industry
because the private sector has a significant informational advantage
over government regulators in offshore drilling. Given this
information asymmetry, the government could promote a safer drilling
regime by creating the incentive for the private sector to police itself.
Some may counter that the industry shouldn't have sole authority to
police itself-a critique commonly made of the cozy relationship
between the oil industry and the old Minerals Management Service in
the mid-2000s. 61 But, the government can establish a regulatory
environment that maintains government oversight, takes advantage
the economic incentives to
of the industry's expertise, and shapes
62
deliver a much safer drilling regime.
A. ContainingFutureDeepwater Wild Wells
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill demonstrated that
technological innovation on the safety dimension had fallen behind
innovation on extraction in deep water. 63 Neither the government nor
the industry had the tools to contain a wild well in deep water. With
the exception of a relief well-drilling a new well to intercept the wild
well at the bottom of the wellbore near the hydrocarbon field, which
would require three months or more for deep fields like the Macondo
Prospect-there were no off-the-shelf, ready-to-go well-containment
measures for a deepwater wild well. 64 In a press conference on May 27,
2010, President Obama proposed an industry consortium to develop
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Announces-Regulations-to-Strengthen-Driling-SafetyReduce-Risk-of-Human-Error-on-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations.cfm.
61. See, e.g., Establishing Office of Inspector Gen. Oversight for MMS' Royalties Collection
Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Mineral Res., 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of the Hon. Earl E. Devaney, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of the Interior), available at
http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/pdf/TESTIMONY%20for%2OMarch%2011.-2008%20MMS%
20hearing.pdf.
62. For a more extensive review of the information asymmetry problem and the need to
orient private-sector incentives toward the socially optimal level of safety, see W. Kip Viscusi and
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterringand Compensating Oil-Spill Catastrophes:The Need for Strict
and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717 (2011).
63. For further elaboration of this point, see Response/ Clean-Up Technology Research and
Development and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Staff Working Paper No. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.oilspilcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%2Response%20RD%2
0Working%20Paper.pdf.
64.

NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra

note 2, at 135.
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the technology necessary to contain future deepwater spills. This
reflected the view that neither the public nor the Administration (nor,
for that matter, members of Congress from both sides of the political
aisle) would have the patience to tolerate a technological response,
such as a relief well, taking three months or more to stop a well from
gushing oil into the Gulf of Mexico in the future.
The President's suggestion of an industry consortium would
improve the safety of offshore drilling by tapping into private-sector
technical expertise. By drawing on the resources and knowledge of
multiple companies, this approach could also spread the costs of
containment capacity across the industry. Given the public-good
nature of an investment in deepwater well containment, individual
65
firms may face inadequate incentives to develop their own capacity.
The perception of a small probability for catastrophic loss-of-wellcontrol events like the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill also suggests
that multiple, redundant deepwater well-containment regimes may be
socially excessive.
In June 2010, the White House hosted several meetings with
oil companies to discuss well containment, lessons from the industry's
Marine Spill Response Corporation ("MSRC"), and the need to fill the
gap in the offshore drilling safety regime. The MSRC serves as one
example of how a deepwater well-containment consortium could work.
In response to the OPA, which requires facilities and vessels to have
resources to respond to a "worst case discharge," 66 the oil industry
created the MSRC. This entity invests in boom, skimmers, in situ burn
equipment, dispersants, full-time personnel, and so forth. As part of
the spill-response plans required by the government before a firm can
secure a drilling permit, the firm operating the lease must show that
it has access to adequate spill-response resources in the event of a
spill. Many firms, including BP, use the MSRC as their means (or part
of their means) for complying with this statutory mandate. 67
Unfortunately, in the case of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the
MSRC did not have assets or a plan for deepwater-wellhead
containment.

65. Any individual firm that invests in deepwater well-containment capacity may face
significant industry, public, and political pressure to deploy its assets for another drilling
company that lacks such resources and has a deepwater wild well.
66. 30 C.F.R. §254.47 (2011) (providing instruction on how to calculate the volume of a
worst-case discharge).
67.

NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra

note 2, at 132.
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To their credit, ExxonMobil led an effort with Chevron,
ConocoPhillips, and Shell to mobilize significant financial and human
resources to launch the Marine Well Containment Company
('MWCC") in July 2010.68 The MWCC has since integrated BP-and
its containment resources developed in response to the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill-for an interim response capacity. As of June 2011,
the membership of the MWCC had expanded to include Anadarko,
Apache, BHP Billiton, Hess, and Statoil, and the ten member firms in
total represent about seventy percent of the deepwater wells drilled in
the Gulf of Mexico between 2007 and 2009.69 The members have equal
ownership in the MWCC. Nonmembers may pay a fee for access to the
MWCC resources on a per-well basis. 70 The MWCC plans to have an
expanded well-containment system available in 2012.71
The availability of deepwater well containment, while a
necessary investment in light of the known risks of deepwater drilling,
could result in moral hazard by some firms operating in the Gulf of
Mexico. To mitigate this possibility, the MWCC could require
obligations by member firms beyond simply paying annual dues. For
example, access to the MWCC "club" could be predicated on operators
satisfying a third-party, private-sector safety review. Drawing from
industry expertise in undertaking inspections could result in safer
drilling operations and could be more effective than government
inspections. Developing the technical capacity to contain a deepwater
wild well should not weaken incentives for safe drilling operations. It
should also be recognized that the MWCC does not remedy the
inadequate incentives for safety under the current legal liability
2
regime.7

68. Press Release, Marine Well Containment Co., New Oil Spill Containment System to
Protect Gulf of Mexico Planned by Major Oil Companies (July 22, 2010), available at
http://marinewellcontainment.com/pdfs/Containment-System-Press-Release-issued%20072 110.
pdf.
69. Press Release, Marine Well Containment Co., Marine Well Containment Company
Establishes Membership (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://marinewellcontainment
.comlpdfs[US-MWCCEstablishesMembership_041811.pdf.
70. See About Us, MARINE WELL CONTAINMENT COMPANY, http://marinewellcontainment
.comlmembership.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
71. Press Release, Marine Well Containment Co., Marine Well Containment Company
Interim System Capping Stack Now Usable in 10,000 Feet of Water (June 14, 2011), available at
http://marinewellcontainment.compdfs/MWCC- 10,000-Feet-Approval_- 061411 .pdf.
72. See Robert Anderson et al., OrganizationalDesign for Spill Containment in Deepwater
Drilling Operations in the Gulf of Mexico: Assessment of the Marine Well Containment Company
(Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 10-63, Jan. 2011), available at http://www.rff.
org/documentsfRFF-DP-10-63.pdf, for recommendations on the design, implementation, and
oversight of deepwater well-containment capacity and procedures.
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B. Promoting Safer Drilling Through an Improved
Liability Regime
By limiting liability to $75 million for damages, the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 provides insufficient incentives for firms to
mitigate the potential harm from offshore drilling. 3 Limiting liability
represents an implicit subsidy for offshore oil and gas development.
The Administration proposed removing the limit on liability.7 4 This
would provide a stronger financial incentive for improved safety and
would also increase the likelihood that liable private firms, as opposed
to taxpayers, would compensate those harmed by future spills. By
removing the liability limit, major shareholders and senior
management of firms engaged in offshore drilling may elevate the
importance of drilling safety within their company operations and in
their business relationships (e.g., among lease operators, rig
operators, and various contractors). This could yield a more effective
culture of safety by motivating a more systems-oriented approach to
safety on drilling rigs through the integration of technology, process,
75
and management safety considerations.
A recent Supreme Court case complicates efforts to apply a
change to the liability regime to the thousands of active oil and gas
leases in the Gulf of Mexico. In the Mobil Oil case, decided in the year
2000, the Court found that the U.S. government would be in breach of
contract if it subjects existing leases to future regulations under new
statutes.7 6 While there is some ambiguity whether this interpretation
applies to legislative modifications to existing provisions of the OPA,
73. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006). For a brief overview of oil-spill liability, see Nathan
Richardson, Deepwater Horizon and the Patchwork of Oil Spill Liability Law (May 2010) (Res.
for
the
Future),
available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-BCK-RichardsonOilLiability.pdf.
74. FY 2010 SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSAL, supra note 22; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 3534-CONSOLIDATED
LAND,
ENERGY
AND
AQUATIC
RESOURCES
ACT
OF
2010
(2010),
available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/omblegislative/sap/1 11/saphr3534r_.20100729.pdf;
Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Legislative Package
(May 12, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-deepwaterhorizon-oil-spill-legislative-package.
75. The Department of the Interior promulgated a regulation in September 2010 mandating
Safety and Environmental Management Systems. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, supra note
60. This regulation is generally consistent with the recommendation of the National Commission
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling for operators in U.S. waters to
implement the "safety case" model to drilling, based on the U.K. and Norwegian experience.
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 2,
at 252.
76. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 620 (2000).
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some legal commentators have identified this interpretation as a
challenge to a new liability regime for existing Gulf of Mexico
operations. 77 An appropriate policy that transitions from the existing
liability regime to a new regime without limits on liability could be
necessary.
As the White House worked with the Senate on oil-spill
legislation, some stakeholders expressed an interest in integrating a
mutual insurance entity with a change in the liability regime. For
example, for a future, large oil spill, the responsible party would be
accountable for an initial tranche of damage liability (i.e., an
insurance deductible), the mutual would be responsible for the second
tranche (i.e., an insurance payout subject to a cap), and any residual
liability would revert back to the responsible party. 78 Such an
approach could be appealing if the mutual insurance provided credible
third-party inspections of drilling operations that drew from privatesector expertise to complement government safety inspections.
This scheme could be similar, in part, to the liability regime for
civilian nuclear power under the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries
Indemnity Act. 79 There are three important differences between the
Price-Anderson Act's approach and what the Administration
considered supporting during talks with congressional staff in 2010.
First, the Price-Anderson Act capped total damage liability at about
$12 billion in 2011,80 which may not be sufficient to cover all potential
77. See generally The Risky Business of Big Oil: Have Recent Court Decisions and Liability
Caps Encouraged Irresponsible Corporate Behavior?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12-13 (2010) (statement of W. Jackson Coleman, Managing Partner,
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdfl0-06-O8Colemans
at
available
EnergyNorthAmerica),
Testimony.pdf (discussing issues raised by the Mobil decision). As an example of this
interpretation beyond the liability context, the Congressional Budget Office's budget score of
H.R. 3534 notes that a significant fraction of revenues raised through a new per-barrel
conservation fee applied to existing leases would be offset through litigation premised on the
Mobil Oil decision. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534,
111th Cong. § 802 (2010); Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to John
M. Spratt, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives (July 27, 2010),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xxdocl1709/SprattLtrhr3534.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,
2011).
78. In other words, this system of liability and insurance is very similar to what most
Americans face with respect to auto insurance. If a driver is found to be at fault in an accident,
then the responsible driver pays a deductible (first tranche of liability), then the insurance
company makes further necessary payments subject to the limits of insurance coverage (second
tranche of liability). If the damages exceed the limits of coverage for collision insurance, then the
liability for the remainder reverts to the responsible driver (final tranche of liability).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
80. Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insuranceand DisasterRelief Funds, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
(last visited
COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmnldoc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html
Sept. 27, 2011).
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economic damages of a nuclear accident and thus may not deliver
sufficient safety incentives.8 1 The Administration unambiguously
supported eliminating the cap on damage liability for offshore drilling.
Second, the Price-Anderson Act's scheme does not operate as a
mutual. Instead of paying regular premiums for insurance, nuclear
power plant operators only pay into a compensation fund, and, in the
event of a disaster at a facility in the nuclear industry, these monies
go to cover the damages that exceed the initial $375 million that are
82
the responsibility of the operator of the facility with the accident.
Given the existing insurance market for offshore drilling (and, by
extension, the reinsurance market that could support a mutual), any
new regime should maintain actual insurance requirements and
include a full-functioning mutual insurance company. Third, it is
important to create the capacity for the mutual to inspect and ensure
high levels of safety for those firms participating in the insurance
scheme.8 3 Given the rarity of catastrophic blowouts, there is a lack of
data to estimate actuarially fair premiums. Since it would be quite
difficult to assess risks and price premiums efficiently, the mutual
should have the opportunity to regularly inspect and demand high
levels of safety. If a firm doesn't meet a preset standard, then the
mutual could charge a higher premium or consider cutting off the
firm's access to the mutual pool and making information about the
firm's substandard safety level public. Of course, such information

'81. See Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, Environmental Assets and Liabilities:
Dealing with Catastrophic Risks 14 (Wharton Sch. Working Paper No. 2008-11-06, 2008),
available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/WP2008-11-06_GH,HKEnvAssets.pdf
(discussing how similar damage caps in Canada and current nuclear power plant insurance
premiums both disincentivize safety precautions).
82.

See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 80.

83. In the U.S. nuclear power industry, a system of industry self-regulation emerged in
response to the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. The industry created the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations ("INPO"), a private entity dedicated to promoting safety in civilian nuclear
power plants. In the preface of JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND, at x (1994), the author notes,
Robert Pollard, a former NRC inspector now with the Union of Concerned Scientists,
thought highly enough of INPO to suggest (only half-jokingly) that the federal
government should nationalize INPO and disband the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory
Commission]. "INPO is doing the job that the NRC inspectors ought to be doing," as he
puts it. "And if NRC inspections were even half as good as INPO's, we would not have
the types of problems we have today."
This is in line with the preferred approach of aligning private incentives to facilitate the use of
oil and gas industry expertise in inspections to improve drilling safety. In contrast to the
proposal made in this Essay, INPO does not make information on individual power plant safety
inspections public.
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would raise concerns among the firm's shareholders about whether it
should operate in deep water in the first place.
The mutual could tap into industry knowledge and experience
for its inspection measures. This process could create additional
incentives for safety, mitigate the moral hazard that could arise from
the creation of the mutual, and, very importantly, take advantage of
private-sector expertise to complement government inspections. The
government could require mutual insurance as a condition for a firm
to secure a drilling permit. This would strengthen the role of thirdparty, private-sector inspections. In addition, the potential liability
borne by other industry firms through the mutual insurance entity
would create the right incentive for this industry self-policing to
8 4
identify those firms with substandard safety regimes.
On July 30, 2010, the House of Representatives passed the
Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, which
removed the limit on liability.8 5 While several Senate committees
passed oil-spill legislation, including one that removed the limit on
liability,8 6 the full Senate did not debate an oil-spill bill in the 111th
Congress.
V. LESSONS LEARNED

The costs of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill were
undoubtedly catastrophic-eleven lives lost, millions of barrels of oil
spilled, a lost fishery and tourism season, coastal ecosystem and
wildlife habitat damage, and the remains of a half-a-billion-dollar rig
resting on the sea floor. Although the oil and gas industry's
innovations have made tremendous strides in advancing the
technological frontier of hydrocarbon extraction, they have not made
similar strides in safety technology that would decrease the
probability of a catastrophe. Three policy lessons from the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill may inform efforts to mitigate the risks of future
deepwater oil spills.
First, it is better to provide a coherent, comprehensive legal
framework for offshore drilling before the government and an oil
company find themselves in the so-called "heat of the battle" of
84. These safety inspections under a mutual insurance/multiple-tranche liability regime
could be integrated with the inspections suggested for access to the MWCC in the previous
Section. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
85. H.R. 3534, 111th Cong. § 702 (2010).
86. Big Oil Bailout Prevention Unlimited Liability Act of 2010, S. 3305, 111th Cong. § 2
(2010).
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another spill. The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in ad hoc
negotiations between the government and the responsible party to try
to design new liability rules and a compensation scheme for those
bearing damages from the spill. The outcome for the residents of the
Gulf Coast could have been very different if the responsible party did
not have (a) deep pockets and (b) a willingness to compensate for
damages beyond the $75 million threshold prior to a legal
determination regarding either gross negligence or regulatory
violations. In the end, the independent claims facility and the escrow
account benefitted both the responsible party and the government, but
a new liability regime would eliminate uncertainty about
compensation and obviate such a need for negotiations in the event of
a future catastrophic spill.
Second, incentives for safer systems of drilling are necessary.
Oil spills often reflect more than just technology and engineering
problems and that was certainly the case with the decisionmaking and
risk management that precipitated the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill.87 Investing in deepwater well-containment capacity is critical,
but not sufficient. New government regulations may not be sufficient
given the informational advantage that the industry has over the
regulator. Changing the incentives in the industry by ensuring that
safety becomes an important operational concern for companies active
in offshore drilling is critical to enhancing safety. Designing
mechanisms for independent and rigorous inspections by industry
experts can also drive safer drilling. Additionally, removing the limit
on liability would further enhance incentives for firms to develop safer
systems for drilling.
Third, effective planning for low-probability, catastrophic
events requires creativity, both to envision unlikely events and to
develop policies and deploy resources that facilitate resilience to a
broad array of risks. Technical responses are not sufficient, since they
may run the risk of solving the last catastrophe's problem but not the
problems of future catastrophes. For example, one could note that the
MSRC was designed to mitigate an Exxon Valdez style of accident.
The emerging MWCC is designed to mitigate a BP Deepwater Horizon
style of accident.8 8 Planning for the next, unforeseen accident should

87.

NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra

note 2, at vii.
88. Richard Zeckhauser emphasized this point during his remarks at the oil-spill conference
on April 1, 2010. See Richard Zeckhauser, Frank Plumpton Ramsey Professor of Political Econ.,
Harvard Kennedy Sch., Keynote Address at Rigs, Risk, and Responsibility: Conference on the BP
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take advantage of these assets and associated response procedures,
but it should also focus on improving the systems-including
personnel training, risk surveillance, decision tools, and so forth-that
manage risk. As exploration and extraction technologies continue to
push into new frontiers, research and development on safety
measures, procedures, and systems-both in the private sector and in
concert with government agencies and experts-should likewise
continue. Broader research on catastrophic risk in complicated
systems would also help inform the management of the risks of
offshore drilling. Indeed, there may be knowledge spillovers from
evaluations of a variety of low-probability, catastrophic events
experienced over the past decade (from the events of September 11th
to Hurricane Katrina to the financial market collapse to the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill to the Fukushima nuclear accident) and
insights of value for potential catastrophic events of the future (e.g.,
impacts of global climate change).
In 2011, Republicans and Democrats alike talked about the
importance of domestic oil and gas development. In April, the
President gave a speech about energy security in which he addressed
89
the need to increase domestic oil and gas production. Republicans
also called for expanding drilling but have expressed no enthusiasm
for government policies that would promote a safer drilling
environment. 90 The failure to learn lessons from the last spill runs the
risk that another major spill could test Americans' patience for oil and
gas development, especially if the industry and the government lack
either the technical means to contain it or the legal and financial
means to secure full compensation for those bearing the damages.
Indeed, another catastrophic oil spill could result in the public turning
against oil and gas as a major part of our energy economy. Thus, we
need to design a regime that delivers the right incentives for safety so
that we can continue domestic production of hydrocarbons without
having people who live in oil-and-gas-intensive regions bear the costs
from this activity.

Oil Spill: Strict and Tiered Liability for Catastrophic Risks: Lessons from the Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill (Apr. 1, 2010).
89. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on America's Energy Security
2
(Mar. 30, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 011/
03/30!remarks-president-americas-energy-security).
90. See Restarting American Offshore Leasing Now Act, H.R. 1230, 112th Cong. (2011)
(proposing an expansion of drilling leases without any mention of safety measures that passed in
the House of Representatives primarily along party lines on May 5, 2011).

